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1. INTRODUCTION
Property valuation is the process of estimating 
price under uncertainty that is a real and uni-
versal phenomenon in valuation. the degree 
of uncertainty will vary according to the level 
of market activity and will vary significantly; 
these variations can arise because of the inher-
ent features of the property or the information 
available to the valuer. these input uncertain-
ties will translate into an uncertainty with the 
output value - the price estimate. one of the 
major problems is that valuation models are 
based on comparable information and rely on 
single inputs. the input variables are uncer-
tain and will have no probability distribution 
that pertains to each of them.
the sources of uncertainty premises origi-
nate in the market specific character, particu-
larly in its informative inefficiency.
according to fama (1965) An efficient mar-
ket is defined as a market where there are large 
numbers of rational profit-maximizers actively 
competing, with each trying to predict future 
market values of individual securities, and 
where important current information is almost 
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freely available to all participants. In an effec-
tive market, competition among the many intel-
ligent participants leads to a situation where, 
at any point in time, actual prices of individual 
securities already reflect the effects of informa-
tion based both on events that have already oc-
curred and on events which the market expects 
to take place in the future.
It means, that on an efficient market, pric-
es always fully reflect the available informa-
tion (Fama, 1970).
the efficient Market Hypothesis (eMH) 
deals with three types of market efficiency:
 – weak form efficiency - the information set 
is that the market index reflects only the 
history of prices or profit returns (of the 
same financial instruments),
 – semi-strong form efficiency - the infor-
mation set includes most information 
known to all market participants,
 – strong form efficiency - the information 
set includes all information known to 
any market participant.
There is no doubt, that in the case of the 
real estate market, exhibiting low transpar-
ency, confidentiality of transactions, and most 
importantly imperfections, weak form efficien-
cy can be considered at best.
Information inefficiency of the real estate mar-
ket is confirmed among others by Wiśniewski’s 
(2007) research, where he underlines (based on 
local real estate markets in Poland), that the 
achieved results incline to conclude, that the ana-
lysed real estate markets are not efficient in terms 
of the weak EMH hypothesis.
Uncertainty, as an objective fact, has been 
noticed by well-known organizations associ-
ating property valuers. Some of them made 
initial actions aiming at creating standards, 
to describe the methods of property valuation 
under uncertainty.
In the study conducted by royal Institution 
of chartered Surveyors (rIcS) recommenda-
tions have been created:
 – Mallinson recommendation 34: Com-
mon professional standards and methods 
should be developed for measuring and 
expressing valuation uncertainty (The 
Mallinson Report, 1994),
and
 – carsberg recommendation 15: RICS 
should commission work to establish an 
acceptable method by which uncertainty 
could be expressed in a manner that will 
be helpful and will not confuse users of the 
valuation. RICS should also seek to agree 
with appropriate representative bodies 
of those commissioning and using third 
party valuations the circumstances and 
format in which the valuer would convey 
uncertainty (The Carsberg Report, 2002).
the objective of both the Mallinson (The 
Mallinson Report, 1994) and Carsberg (The 
Carsberg Report, 2002) recommendations is to 
establish an acceptable method by which uncer-
tainty could be expressed in a uniform and use-
ful manner. this requires agreement on both 
the expression of the uncertainty of the inputs 
and agreement on the output information that 
must be conveyed with each valuation.
Investigations into the expression of uncer-
tainty in property valuations were made by, 
i.a., Mallinson and French (2000), Siniak and 
d’Amato (2003), Joslin (2005), French and Ga-
brielli (2004, 2005, 2006) and Atherton et al. 
(2008).
the majority of the above-mentioned authors 
prefer simulation models that allow the user to 
incorporate uncertainty into the analysis in a 
relatively simple form (each input is defined by 
the chosen probability density function).
as shown by french and gabrielli (2004) 
the sources of uncertainty can be identified 
and described in a practical manner, and, 
above all, the process of identification and de-
scription will greatly assist many clients and 
will improve the content and the credibility of 
the valuer’s work. french and gabrielli (2004) 
distinguish two kinds of uncertainty:
 – normal uncertainty, as a universal and 
an unsurprising fact of property valua-
tion,
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 – abnormal uncertainty, that arises when 
some particular condition of the market 
or the property leads to the valuer being 
unable to value with the confidence of ac-
curacy that might normally be expected.
In practice, however, as indicated by 
Kucharska-Stasiak (2008), the property valu-
ation is based on prices under the assumption 
that the market is efficient; however in reality, 
prices do not fully reflect the available infor-
mation about attributes of comparable prop-
erties. In terms of information inefficiency of 
the real estate market, statistical methods are 
ineffective for the property valuation, hence 
the need to use methods and models taking 
into account uncertainty. Uncertainty, as an 
objective state in the valuation process, might 
be modelled with the use of different methods 
together with different kinds of models. In this 
paper, the discussion has been raised on the 
usefulness of simulation models and strategic 
models based on game theory. In those two 
cases, pairwise comparison method was used, 
whose principles were further discussed in 
Section 2.
2. MODELLING OF SALES 
COMPARISON APPROACH  
(PAIRWISE COMPARISON METHOD)
the sales comparison approach estimates the 
value of a subject property from the sales pric-
es of the comparable properties. Sales prices 
of comparable properties are adjusted for dif-
ferences from the subject property; the adjust-
ments are derived from local sales analysis.
In the pairwise comparison method, the 





















of which: V – Market Value of the subject prop-
erty; Cjk – jth  comparable property sales price, 
adjusted by the sum of adjustments; qj –jth 
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concerning the jth comparable property sales 







C C C p
a a
−
∆ = − ⋅ ⋅
−
 (4)
where: pi – ith attributes’ weight; Cmax – maxi-
mum price of the comparable property; Cmin – 
minimum price of the comparable property; 
aiw – assessment of ith attribute of the subject 
property; aij – assessment of ith attribute of 
jth comparable property; ai min – the worst as-
sessment of ith attribute among comparable 
properties; ai max – the best assessment of ith 
attribute among comparable properties.
Data presented in Table 1 were used to 
show the process of modelling property valu-
ation under uncertainty (shown in Sections 3 
and 4).
using classic rules of pairwise comparison 
method, represented by formula (1–4), and 
taking into consideration identical weight of 
attributes and identical sales price reliability, 
following the valuation, the value of V = 79.79 
eur/1m2 (table 2) results.
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3. MODELLING OF PROPERTY 
VALUATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
USING SIMULATION
the use simulation models (Monte carlo Sim-
ulation) that can be solved with the use of 
crystal Ball software is a subject of various 
papers including Mallinson and French (2000), 
French and Gabrielli (2004, 2005, 2006).
Mallinson and french (2000) argued that 
there were six items of information that should 
be conveyed when reposting uncertainty:
 – the single figure valuation – market val-
ue (V),
 – the range of the most likely observation 
<Va, Vb> (e.g. 5 per cent either side of V),
 – the probability of the most likely obser-
vation P <Va, Vb>,
 – the range of higher probability P <Vc, 
Vd >,
 – the range of 100 per cent probability P 
<Vmin, Vmax >,
 – the skewness of probabilities.
the above suggestions can be presented as 
shown in figure 1.
french and gabrielli (2005) made a certain 
modification of this viewpoint and indicated 
that the sufficient range of data includes:
 – the single figure valuation – market val-
ue (V),
 – the certainty range at 5 per cent, 10 per 
cent, 50 per cent and 100 per cent,
Table 1. the basis for comparable properties and their assessment
attribute Weight of
attributes




N1 N2 N3 N4
attribute 1 p1 3 4 2 1 3
attribute 2 p2 2 1 4 5 1
Property sales price Cj (eur/1m2) 70 80 90 80
Sales price reliability q1 q2 q3 q4
Table 2. Property valuation according to pairwise comparison method represented by formula (1–4)
attribute Weight of 
attributes
(Cmax – Cmin)pi ai max – ai min N1 N2 N3 N4
attribute 1 0.5 10 3 aiw–aij –1 1 2 0
ΔCij –3.33 3.33 6.67 0.00
attribute 1 0.5 10 4 aiw–aij 1 –2 –3 1
















69.17 78.33 89.17 82.50
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Figure 1. Demonstrative presentation of property value as a result of a simulation





Vmin Vc Va VbV
V
Vd Vmax
Table 3. types of parameters for the simulation of property valuation
attribute Weight of 
attributes
(Cmax – Cmin)pi aimax – aimin comparable properties
N1 N2 … Nn
attribute 1 p1 (Cmax – Cmin)p1 a1max – a1min a1w–a11 a1w–a12 … a1w–a1n
ΔC11 ΔC12 … ΔC1n
attribute 2 p2 (Cmax – Cmin)p2 a2max – a2min a2w–a21 a2w–a22 … a2w–a2n
ΔC21 ΔC22 … ΔC2n
… … … … … … … …
… … … …
attribute m pm (Cmax – Cmin)pm ammax – ammin amw–am1 amw–am2 … amw–amn




















































































Values calculated based on primary simulation
Values that are not the subject of simulation
The end result calculated, based on primary simulation and based on values that are not the subject of 
simulation
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 – the skewness of the distribution (report-
ed as per cent at either end of range).
the key factor for simulation models is the 
way of expressing of the input data that are 
burdened with uncertainty. Mallinson and 
french (2000) suggested that the appropriate 
probability distribution would be a normal or 
bell distribution, whereas French and Gabri-
elli (2004, 2005) state, that the triangular ap-
proach is the most appropriate given the objec-
tives.
the simulation in this paper has been ap-
plied within the pairwise comparison method 
where uncertainty was expressed through the 
assumption that the weights of attributes (pi) 
and the adjusted sales price reliability (qj) are 
not explicitly defined; they are only known as 
uniform distributed and assume the values: 

















taking into consideration the indicators as 
in Table 1, the simulation of property valua-
tion is presented in table 3.
the simulation made with the use of crys-
tal Ball software, using the data from Table 1, 
produced the outcome shown in figure 2.
taking into consideration the suggestions 
of french and gabrielli (2005) figure 3 shows 
the intervals of the property value correspond-
ing to the level of certainty of 5%, 10% and 
50% respectively.
the summary of the results obtained fol-
lowing the solution of the simulation model 
has been shown in figure 6 in Section 5.
4. MODELLING OF PROPERTY 
VALUATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
WITH THE USE OF GAME THEORY
the game theory can be used for sustainable 
decision-making; many authors have applied 
game theory to solve problems in construc-
tion engineering and management; i.a.: Peld-
schus and Zavadskas (2005) investigated fuzzy 
matrix game in construction, Lo et al. (2006) 
presented game theory model for evacuation, 
Sacks and goldin (2007) tested lean man-
agement model for construction of high-rise 
apartment buildings using simulation game, 
Figure 2. Market value distribution as an outcome of a simulation  
of the property valuation according to data from table 1
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Figure 3. The certainty range at 5%, 10% and 50%
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gu et al. (2009) analysed chinese strategies 
for energy-efficient housing development from 
an architect’s perspective, Peldschus et al. 
(2010) demonstrate construction site selec-
tions, Miao et al. (2010) applied bi-level games 
for sustainable critical infrastructure system, 
Medineckienė et al. (2011) described model of 
dwelling selection, using fuzzy games theory, 
chen et al. (2012) used bargaining-game theo-
ry to analysis of build-operate-transfer strate-
gies, Zandi et al. (2012) proposed cooperative 
game-theoretic model for market segmenta-
tion.
A broad review of game theory rise, prog-
ress and applications is published by Peld-
schus (2008), Kapliński and Tamošaitienė 
(2010), Zavadskas and Turskis (2011), Peld-
schus and Zavadskas (2012).
As indicated in Section 2, the estimated 
market value of property depends on two pa-
rameters (weight of pi property attributes and 
qj sales price reliability), which in light of the 
presented remarks should be acknowledged 
as parameters determined in uncertainty 
(Meszek, 2007, 2008). The uncertainty taking 
place in the property valuation process may 
be interpreted in the context of decision situ-
ation where two parties affect (influence) the 
formation of the decision parameters (pi, qj) in 
question, the values of which are known in the 
form of closed sets.
the issue of optimisation is oriented at the 
state of balance, being at the same time the 
expression of rational behaviour (action) of two 
parties in a decision situation. the so far ex-
isting research explicitly proved that the use 
of two-person zero sum strategic games in the 
form of, as we call it, games with Nature is 
also reasonable where there is no real conflict 
of interest between the parties in a decision 
situation. It has been proven that finding pa-
rameters corresponding to the saddle point (re-
lated to the equilibrium phenomenon) provides 
a satisfactory solution. 
the strategic model representing the situ-
ation discussed is in the form of a two-person 
zero sum game, where its nature is more com-
plex than the „game with nature” – it cor-
responds to the essence of the “nature with 
nature” game.
for the purpose of this paper the two-per-
son zero-sum game is used:
Γ = (X, Y, a) (6)
its mixed extension Γm in particular:
( ), , ,m P Q HΓ =  (7)
where: P (p1, …, pi,…, pm) – strategy encom-









=∑  0 1;ip≤ ≤  Q (q1, 
…, qi,…, qn) – strategy encompassing a set of 
reliability of comparable property individual 
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(p, q )– pay-off function.
for every mixed strategy P and Q, the ex-
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the basic problem to be solved in the prop-
erty valuation process is the appropriate inter-
pretation of game matrix elements (hij). from 
the usability point of view (the game value 
must signify the property value), the game ma-
trix elements must represent a corresponding 
category. Based on the logic of the theory of 
games, a principle was assumed that the hij el-
ement denotes the hypothetical values of a val-
ued property, determined for the cases where 
pi weights and qj reliability would be equal to 
1, i.e. hij = V for pi = 1 and qj = 1.
this kind of strategic game can be repre-
sented as matrix:






















ij jk j ij
i
h C C C
=
′ ′= = + ∆∑  (10)
where: ∆C’ij – adjustments as in (4) formula, 









∆ = − ⋅
−
 (11)





















formula (10) can be presented as:
( ).jk j i iw ijC C A a a′ = + ⋅ −  (13)
In this situation, the initial decision mak-
ing matrix shown in the form of (8) takes a 
form:
according to von neumann and Morgen-
stern (1944), the search for a strategic model 
solution is based on the statement ...each two-
player zero sum strategic game with a finite 
quantity of pure strategies P and Q has in its 
mixed extension, the game value V and each 
player has at least one mixed strategy p* ∈ P 
or q* ∈ Q, that guarantees obtaining a result 
equal to the game value … 
The above means that in each finished two-
person game, there is a pair of optimum mixed 
strategies (p*, q*) representing the saddle 
point of game Γm.
Determining the value of game V as the 
value of property V1 and assuming that such 
value is minimized from the point of view of 
the first decision situation participant, the 
process of searching for an optimum mixed 
strategy consists in a game model solution for 
which the solution p* = (p1*, ..., pm*) and value 
V1 are sought.
Due to the character of decision situation 
participants (NATURE I – participant influ-
encing pi values and nature II – participant 
influencing qj values), the analysis must con-
sider two games simultaneously based on simi-
lar payoff matrixes (differing by signs, or the 
interpretation of elements). 
Game I: losses for participant No 1, profits 
for participant No 2; the saddle point prereq-
uisite is then the rule:
( ) ( )
( ) 1
max min , min max ,
*, * .
j ji i
H p q H p q
H p q V
= =
=  (14)
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1





... ... ... ... ... ...
... ...
... ... ... ... ... ...
... ...
j n
w j w j n w n
i i iw i j i iw ij n i iw in
m m mw m j m mw mj n m mw mn
q q q
p C A a a C A a a C A a a
p C A a a C A a a C A a a
p C A a a C A a a C A a a
+ ⋅ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ −
+ ⋅ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ −
+ ⋅ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ −
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Game II: profits for participant No 1, losses 
for participant No 2; the saddle point 
prerequisite is then the rule:
( ) ( )
( ) 1
max min , min max ,
*, * .
j ji i
H p q H p q
H p q V
= =
=  (15)
of which: V1 and V2 – estimated property mar-
ket value as a result of game I and II.
There are a number of methods of finding 
the optimum mixed strategies: graphic, alge-
braic or iteration simulation methods. In the 
case of many variable numbers, a useful tool 
to solve strategic models is the leVI software. 
Version 4.0 of this software is described, i.a. by 
Zavadskas et al. (2008).
the following calculation process is based 
on data from table 1. In view of a small 
amount of variables, the analysed issue is 
solved with the use of a linear model.



















and after substituting the rest of the data from 
Table 1, the result is the matrix in the form of 
(eur/1m2):
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )




70 6,67 3 4 ... 80 6,67 3 2 ... 90 6,67 3 1 ... 80 6,67 3 3
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
70 5,00 2 1 ... 80 5,00 2 4 ... 90 5,00 2 5 ... 80 5,00 2 1
q q q q
p
p
+ ⋅ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ −
+ ⋅ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ −
and finally:




63,33 ... 86,67 ... 103,33 ... 80,00
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
75,00 ... 70,00 ... 75,00 ... 85,00
q q q q
p
p
The linear model that enables finding of the 
optimal mixed strategy leading to game value 
V1 takes the form:
 – objective function: V1 → max
 – limiting conditions:
1 2 163,33 75,00 ;p p V⋅ + ⋅ ≥
1 2 186,67 70,00 ;p p V⋅ + ⋅ ≥
1 2 1103,33 75,00 ;p p V⋅ + ⋅ ≥
1 2 180,00 85,00 ;p p V⋅ + ⋅ ≥
1 2 1,p p+ =
 – boundary conditions:
0 1.ip≤ ≤
The linear model, however, that enables 
finding of the optimal mixed strategy leading 
to game value V2 takes the form:
 – objective function: V2 → max
 – limiting conditions:
1 2 3 4 263,33 86,67 103,33 80,00 ;q q q q V⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ≥
1 2 3 4 275,00 70,00 75,00 85,00 ;q q q q V⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ≥
1 2 3 4 1,q q q q+ + + =
 – boundary conditions:
0 1.jq≤ ≤
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after the necessary transformations and 
solving of the models, the outcomes are:
V1 = 72.94 eur/1m2
V2 = 83.50 eur/1m2
taking into consideration a low number of 
variables in the analysed models their solu-
tions can be presented graphically as shown 
in figure 4.
the results were obtained by means of the 
game theory maintaining the characteristics 
of variables of an uncertain nature (their dis-
tributions of probability were unknown). they 
allow, however, further analyses, including, 
without limitations, the investment efficiency 
under uncertainty and the sensitivity analysis.
the range of values as a solution to the 
strategic model is dependent on the proper-
ties of the strategic game payoff matrix. In 
particular, it is dependent on the variability 
of the ratings of the individual characteristics 
and the degree of similarity of the compared 
property (subject property and comparable 
properties).
Figure 4. a graphic interpretation of the interval of property value  
as a result of a strategic model
5. CONCLUSIONS
the comparison of the results of the analysed 
models is presented in the background of the 
simulation histogram (Figure 5), while the 
complex comparison, taking into account vari-
ous ranges of certainty is presented in figure 6.
The range of values, estimated by the solu-
tion of the strategic model does not have a logi-
cal contradiction with the solutions obtained 
from the simulation model. 
full equivalent of the uncertainty in the 
simulation model would be the solution at the 
certainty level of 100%. as we can see in fig-
ure 6 the range of the values obtained as a 
result of the solution of the strategic model is 
much narrower than that obtained as a result 
of the application of the simulation model for 
the certainty level of 100%. this means that 
the solution of the strategic model is a sig-
nificant supplement to the solutions available 
within the simulation model.  This confirms, 
that game theory, compared with a simulation 
offers an appropriate approach to modelling of 











Figure 5. the interval of property value as a solution to the strategic model  
in the background of the simulation histogram
Figure 6. comparison of the results obtained in effect of the applied simulation  
and the strategic model





Result of strategic model
Results of simulation model
Certainty
Market Value (Eur/1m2)V = 79,79
the object of the modelling by the proposed 
methodology can be all urban real estate (un-
developed land, built-up property, real estate 
housing) for which property valuation is de-
termined with the use of a sales comparison 
approach.
the solutions to the analysed models pave 
the way for the analysis of the investment ef-
ficiency, taking into account the uncertainty 
as a normal market feature deriving from the 
nature of a property.
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